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Notes on The Really Tough Questions About Cuba

Is Agrarian Reform Negotiable? Russian ships steaming away with missiles, meekly uncovering their decks for U.S. inspection, are a symbol of American military primacy, in the Western Hemisphere at least. They are also a reminder that all the problems of the world are not encompassed in our obsessed quarrel with the Russians. For they do not solve the problem of Castro. What are we going to do about him? We have the requisite force to crush him. But we don't have a political solution. The exiles are terribly fragmented. Those with the best chance of winning popular support in Cuba—those whose slogan is Fidelismo without Fidel—the non-Communist left—are the ones our military and intelligence bureaucracies like least. Those they like best are the ones least likely to win popular support in Cuba: the petty oligarchy which was content in a junior partnership with U.S. sugar, cattle and oil interests. In Guatemala we turned back the clock; the United Fruit company lands were restored. But Cuba is not Guatemala. The effort at such a solution would require another occupation, but the middle of the twentieth century is a poor time for old style colonial occupations. The price in lives and respect would be great, the chances of success minimal. What are our war aims in Cuba? Do we accept the expropriation of the sugar and cattle lands? The expropriation of the oil refineries? How much socialism will we allow in Cuba? When these practical questions are asked the dimensions of the political problem appear. We have said Communism in Cuba is not negotiable. Is agrarian reform negotiable? That is the question on which Latin America waits for an answer.

What Booth Did For Lincoln

Drift to War or Move Toward Peace? If we kill Castro, we do for him what John Wilkes Booth did for Lincoln; we make him a legend, we save him from the practical agonies of Reconstruction. We send him down in history with Bolivar and Juarez. If we go in and fight Cuba, we split the hemisphere against us. If we win, we will have a bloody mess on our hands. The wise and magnanimous solution is to make peace with Castro. Now after the Russian backdown, and the elections, Kennedy is strong enough to do it. It would take courage, far greater courage than to press the buttons which might set off a world conflagration; it would require the courage to stand up against popular misconceptions, to lead. The Fidelistas are disillusioned with the Russians. Now is the time to win them back. The Brazilian resolution for a nuclear free Latin America, complete with a provision on verification, offers a face-saver for both Kennedy and Castro. The Cuban government has indicated on several occasions recently that it is willing to negotiate compensation for properties taken if we resume trade and friendly relations. It has offered to disarm altogether if we give it firm guar-

Farewell to Mrs. Roosevelt

This issue is dedicated with love and reverence to Eleanor Roosevelt. No woman in history ever left so universal a sense of loss among people everywhere. Her devotion and her faith remain comfort and inspiration, in murky hours such as this one, for all who, in the Quaker sense, are concerned. We feel that we have lost a mother, and seen the passage of a saint.

antees. To win Cuba back honorably, to accept its revolution, would also win a battle for us in the minds of the Latin American masses. It would alarm the oligarchs, but the oligarchs in their blindness are a menace to the stability of the hemisphere. Have we the resolution to seize the opportunity? Or will we be drawn by the undertow sooner or later into war with Cuba?

Why The Big Naval Buildup? The U.S. press is now self-censored on military deployments. But it appears from *The Times* of London that a buildup of naval power in the Caribbean is underway of formidable dimensions. Its Panama correspondent reported (Nov. 6) that all commercial traffic through the Panama Canal was shut off "so that between 17 and 25 U.S. naval vessels could move from the Pacific to the Caribbean." Next day he reported U.S. naval vessels were still moving through eastward. Its Washington correspondent Nov. 9 said the U.S. fleet off Cuba was being heavily reinforced and the Administration was "again preparing, or going through the motions of preparing, for any eventualities. *One senior official said today that invasion was the only certain way of ensuring full inspection.*" (Our italics.)

Where Does Inspection End? The senior official quoted by the London *Times* as saying "invasion was the only certain way of ensuring full inspection" was, of course, quite right. The newspapers, in talking of on-site inspection to check the removal of missiles and Il-28 planes, are confused and confusing. On-site inspection arises in connection with suspected secret underground tests; on the site one can determine whether an explosion took place. But once aerial reconnaissance has shown the removal of missiles, what is the point of on-site inspection? If they, or the planes, are to be dismantled and hidden, they would hardly be left on the site where they were originally spotted. They would be moved into hiding elsewhere. To comb an island which reaches the distance from Washington to Chicago for hidden arms is quite a job. It is the kind of job suitable only for the occupying army of a victorious power, and the Cubans naturally object to it. Castro in his Nov. 8 speech said he would not allow inspection inside Cuba because that would be accepting the principle that the U.S. decided what weapons Cuba could have.

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No Clear Non-Invasion Pledge Even If All Our Conditions Met

"Inspection" would enable the U.S. to learn exactly what kind of arms an invading force would encounter, what caves had been converted into underground shelters, and how Cuba's forces were deployed. "Inspection" would facilitate invasion.

Weasel Words

Why No Firm Non-Invasion Pledge? This right to inspect may seem all the more threatening to the Cubans in view of our failure to offer a clear pledge against invasion. On ABC-TV's *Issues and Answers* Nov. 11, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric was asked what he would say to those Republican critics who claim that Kennedy's promise to Khrushchev "guarantees a sanctuary for Communism in the Western hemisphere." Mr. Gilpatric replied first that no such obligation exists since the "Soviet performance has only been partial." Then he went on to say that "assuming for the moment that the Soviet performance is complete" bringing into play our non-invasion pledge "it may not fundamentally change the status quo because under the Rio Pact and under our own national policy we have never had an objective of invading Cuba. We have an objective of maintaining peace in the Caribbean, of protecting the United States and honoring our treaty obligations under both the UN Charter and the Rio Pact." But what if we think this objective requires us to invade? Mr. Gilpatric was asked whether such a course of action "will not be closed to us if the Soviets do carry out their pledge to remove all offensive weapons?" To this Mr. Gilpatric replied cryptically, "The Castro problem we had before the Soviets decided to establish a major military base in Cuba and we will have the problem after the Soviets' base is removed." The Cubans have a right to a clearer answer. So do all those everywhere who want peace.

A New Doctrine of Inspection? In that same program Mr. Gilpatric seemed to be putting forward a new and disturbing theory of the right to "inspect" other countries. He said "we regard aerial reconnaissance as a part of our inherent self-defense." This prompted the question, "Do you mean we might continue aerial inspection even though we were totally assured that the missiles will be removed?" To which Mr. Gilpatric replied,

Deputy Defense Sec'y Denies Missiles in Cuba Threatened Nuclear Balance of Power

Mr. [John] SCALI (ABC): Do you think that perhaps Mr. Khrushchev might have decided on this very chancy maneuver [placing missiles in Cuba] because he realized that compared to the U.S. the Soviet Union is weak in its ability to deliver nuclear warheads on target?

Mr. [Roswell] GILPATRIC (Deputy Secretary of Defense): I do not regard the Soviets as considering themselves weak. We do feel we have, as we have stated several times during the past 12 to 18 months, a measurable margin of superiority in strategic weapons. Khrushchev, we think, knows that while our intelligence is not precise enough to put a pair of calipers on the margin of the superiority we enjoy, it may be such as to lead him to think that he had to improve his strategic posture but in my own mind the military equation was not altered, the military equation between the Soviets and the U.S., by bringing closer to our shores of these missiles that previously had been ranged against us, or longer range missiles of the same weapon-carrying capacity at longer range. After all, the Soviets have missile-bearing submarines. Those submarines can reach our shores and warheads comparable to

The Il-28 and the B-47

Mr. [Bob] CLARK (ABC): How about the Soviet jet bombers in Cuba, are we going to insist that they go, too?

Mr. [Roswell L.] GILPATRIC (Deputy Secretary of Defense): We regard them as offensive weapons. They have strategic capabilities similar to our own B-47s.

—ABC-TV's *Issues and Answers*, Nov. 11.

This seems to be stretching it a bit. Here is how (according to Jane's) the two planes compare:

	Il-28	B-47
Speed	522 mph	630 mph
Ceiling	20,000 ft.	40,000 ft.
Range	1500 miles	3,000 miles
Bomb Load	6600 lbs.	20,000 lbs.

The B-47 is a strategic bomber. According to "The Soviet Air Force" (1962) by the British expert Asher Lee, the Il-28 is a tactical bomber, used for air-ground support. In recent years it has been supplied by the Russians to the Egyptians and the Afghans as well as to their own satellites. In the period 1956-7 the older Il-28 began to be replaced in the Soviet Air Force by a supersonic improvement. The Il-28 is obsolete by Big Power standards. The Il-28 could help stand off an invading force with second rate aircraft but would be no match (as we pointed out last week) for our own supersonic interceptors and anti-aircraft.

As I say, the conduct of aerial reconnaissance is part of our overall intelligence collection system and we are never going to bargain away any part of our right of self-defense, which includes the right of aerial reconnaissance. I do not know as of today what the need would be in the future for a particular type or a particular frequency of aerial surveillance over Cuba or any other foreign country. Other countries regard the right to shoot down intruders over their air space as a part of their "inherent self-defense." So will we if we ever catch Russian or Cuban planes over our territory. We promised the Russians no longer to send U-2s over their territory. Does this mean we go on using them, however, over weaker countries like Cuba? What if Cuba, like Russia and China, again shoots down a U-2 or some other reconnaissance plane to shield its defenses from hostile eyes? What do we do?

those that would have been borne by those missiles could be struck from submarines off our shore. So that I don't believe there was any major change in the over-all military equation as a result of this particular deployment.

Mr. [Bob] CLARK (ABC): Do you think then that we have overemphasized the danger of these bases?

Mr. GILPATRIC: Not at all. I think the presence of the missiles there, in this context of this being the first time the Soviets had ever put any such weapons outside their own immediate territory and in a situation where they might not always be able to control them, where you had a much shorter warning period and where the effect on the Latin American countries as well as on ourselves in the Western Hemisphere was very destabilizing—it changed the juxtaposition of these arrays of power, so I think it was of major importance, of great danger to us but I don't believe that we were under any greater threat from the Soviet Union's power taken in its totality after this than we were before. It was simply an element of flexibility introduced into the power equation that the Soviets had not heretofore possessed.

—ABC-TV's *Issues and Answers*, Nov. 11.

California Sending Three New Anti-War Congressmen to Washington

First Complete Survey of the Peace Candidates Around the Country

By Sanford Gottlieb
Political Action Director, Nat'l SANE

The small band of peace-oriented Congressmen will be bolstered by fresh faces from California when the next session begins in January. George Brown, Jr., and Edward Roybal, liberal Democrats from Los Angeles who received the active support of SANE in the primaries, have won election to the House. They will be joined by a like-minded newcomer from San Diego, Lionel Van Deerlin. The only California peace candidate who did not survive is John O'Connell of San Francisco, surprisingly overwhelmed in a Democratic district by Republican Representative Mailliard. Other House freshmen such as Don Fraser (D., Minn.) and Claude Pepper may add weight to the group in the House.

Reps. Edith Green, Robert Kastenmeier and William Fitts Ryan will be back, although Frank Kowalski will not. Ryan garnered almost 73 percent of the vote in a partially new district.

Women Candidates Fared Worse Than Men

Among the peace candidates who ran as district underdogs in the major parties, all met defeat as expected. Some of them—Jerome Ziegler and Bob Wilson in Illinois, Tom Payne of Ann Arbor, Mich., Blaine Whipple in Oregon—reduced the margin by which their incumbent opponents had won election in 1960. On the other hand, an equal number—Caroline Ramsay in Baltimore, William Hefner in Western Massachusetts, Alice Franklin Bryant in Seattle, and Martin Dworkin in Manhattan—lost by larger margins. Nothing very conclusive can be learned from these results, except that progress seems to come more easily in less populated, safely Republican districts where the Democratic Party has been only a skeleton in the past. We have a feeling, no more than a hunch, that the women fared somewhat worse than their male colleagues because the American public feels more secure entrusting decisions to men in times of crisis.

Jerome Ziegler, who ran one of the most effective peace campaigns in the country (as measured by ability to communicate with his constituents), was victimized shortly before election day by a smear tactic linking him to the Communist Party. A leaflet was widely distributed reproducing an appeal by *The Worker* to vote for peace candidates. The leaflet also showed Ziegler listed as a sponsor of Voters for Peace in Chicago.

Smear That Failed

The Christian Freedom Fighters have made a contribution to the American political dialogue. Citing Rep. Robert Kastenmeier's role in producing "the Liberal Papers," the group distributed a handbill in his district asking: "Mr. K (the balance of the Congressman's name was printed in small type), Why Are You Trying to 'Bury Us'?" He was accused of "advocating our surrender on the installment plan" through disengagement and reciprocal initiatives. The handbill ended on an inspirational note: "Jesus Christ, Not Karl Marx." This message changed neither Kastenmeier's majority nor the fact that "The Liberal Papers" is an innocuous collection of essays, unread by most of the "Freedom Fighters."

The link was made explicit for those who might have failed to grasp the point. Ziegler received 40 percent of the vote, but expected to do better. The most vigorous Democrat to oppose Rep. Elmer Holland, Ziegler had strong labor support in the Joliet area, a base among the more liberal farmers, and the help of scientists and technicians from Argonne National Laboratory. If he chooses to run again, 1964 could be his year.

The peace candidates who ran on third-party tickets were virtually ignored by the voters, although in most cases they succeeded in airing the issues. The votes of William Hart, independent candidate for the Senate in Wisconsin, still had not been counted one week after the election and in one county his name did not even appear on the ballot. The three Voters for Peace write-in candidates in the Chicago area averaged 1,000 votes apiece. Harrop Freeman, Liberal Party candidate in the Ithaca, N. Y., district, received three percent of the tally, while Harry Purvis, independent candidate in Nassau County, Long Island, polled one percent. These results correspond closely to Stuart Hughes' share of the Massachusetts vote.

For the peace movement as a whole, 1962 was the year when it began to get its feet wet politically. Between now and 1964, it must make the big jump toward a "winner" psychology—and more winners. Two years hence will be too late for purely educational campaigns. This is the time for building a base, both within the major parties and in the community at large, for the peace candidates of 1964.

Cuban Crisis Cut Suddenly and Drastically Into The Expected Hughes Vote in Mass.

The impulse to close ranks behind the President during the Cuban crisis cut drastically into the vote for Stuart Hughes in Massachusetts. His 49,127 ballots amount to approximately two percent of those cast in the contest for the Senate seat won by the President's youngest brother. The week before the election poll in *The Boston Globe* predicted that Hughes would indeed receive two percent, a drop from the seven percent forecast earlier. Other pre-Cuba polls had shown the independent candidate attaining 10 percent.

This sudden shift shows once again the serious shortcomings of running a campaign outside of the major-party framework. Support melts when the going gets rough. International tension or even the prospect of tipping a close election to a conservative candidate make liberal voters

uneasy about a third party.

While the Hughes campaign was geared primarily to discussing peace issues rather than amassing votes, all concerned knew that in the view of politicians, the ballot is the payoff. In this light the small number of votes is a defeat for the peace movement. Yet the less tangible impact of the public debate and news media coverage represents a net gain.

The Hughes organization has decided not to dissolve. The local campaign coordinators will be linked through a statewide body with an office in Cambridge. Although the future orientation of the group is not yet clear, the value of grassroots organization is. In areas where the Hughes forces were best organized, their candidate polled 7 to 12 percent of the vote.

Bright Spots: Nixon's Downfall, Birchite Defeats, Failure of Red Smear Campaigns

Election Returns Reflect A Contended Conformist "Immobile" America

The election results show how badly we need to bring the French word "immobilisme" into English. The French use it for static political situations: motionlessness, immobility. It applies with exactitude to the American electorate at this time. Kennedy in his election campaign used the slogan, "let's get American moving again." But the election results show the country is in no move to budge, either rightward or leftward, and two years of Kennedy have shown that he is not the man to give the voters anything they don't want. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., popularized the idea of "the vital center" but what our country seems to be on is a dead center. About the only visible flurry on the stagnant surface is the desire for a little more social welfare, as on medical care.

Liberals Reelected

The bright spots in the returns were the defeat of the two Birchite members of Congress, Rousselot and Hiestand of California while three peace candidates were elected from the same State; the downfall of Nixon; the failure of Red smear tactics in California, in Pennsylvania (against Senator Clark) and in Wisconsin against Kastenmeier; the reelection of all the Congressmen associated with "The Liberal Papers." The Democratic Study Group believes it will have five or six more votes for rules reform, but don't bank too heavily on it. The same old Southern troglodytes will site in the same key chairmanships when Congress reconvenes, assuring minority checks on majority rule. . . .

Liberal victory footnote: A Treasury briefing on the new budget estimates produced this summary in the *Washington Star* (Nov. 12), "Expenditures for defense and space will rise substantially over fiscal 1963. But the President reportedly is slashing agency requests severely in civilian areas. . . ."

Test for Kennedy: Goldwater's attack on Stevenson, Bowles, Schlesinger and Goodwin is not to be lightly dismissed. The strategy is to make them "controversial" and impair their usefulness. Truman refused to give when Acheson came under similar but far more severe attack, and kept him as Secretary of State to the end. It will be interesting to see whether Kennedy proves as tough. . . .

Der Spiegel is what *Time* magazine would be if it were run by Drew Pearson instead of Henry Luce, i.e. lively, irreverent, and muck-raking. It has exposed the Nazis in the German government; it carried the first friendly account in the German press of the progress being made by the Poles in the Oder-Neisse territory. The text of the law being applied against *Der Spiegel* (it was printed in *Le Monde*, Nov. 7) is appallingly loose in its definitions of official secrets and of treason. The former covers any matters "on which it is necessary to preserve secrecy . . . for the good of the Federal

The Little Black Boxes and A Test Ban

We appeal to scientists associated with the Pugwash conference to answer the Teller-style campaign unleashed in off-the-record briefings by U.S. agencies against the idea of using "little black boxes" in a compromise test ban agreement. The public is being given the idea that these sealed automatic seismographs could be doctored by reading a fake recording into them to hide a clandestine underground nuclear test. But since the network and the supervising commission would depend on scores of seismographs in various countries and of various kinds, and on the tell-tale pattern established by collating various readings, any such seismographic forgery would require impossibly skillful tampering with large numbers of boxes to make them match the fake recording. It would not be enough to doctor the records in one's own country. It would also be necessary to doctor the records and deceive the larger observatories abroad. The real difficulty is that inspection has been built up into a dogma in this country and any treaty without some inspection feature would have hard going in the Senate. U.S. fears of secret testing and Soviet fears of espionage are both highly exaggerated. Neither side wants an agreement badly enough to concede.

Republic" and transmitting such secrets to unauthorized persons is defined as treason. No Western country defines either official secrets or treason that loosely. Anthony Terry reported from Bonn in the *London Sunday Times* (Nov. 11) "Apart from the 'liberal third' of the population, which genuinely fears a return to police state methods and the suppression of free speech, a surprisingly large number of ordinary West Germans have no idea of the wider issues involved. They are highly critical of the *Spiegel* for "attacking prominent public figures" and they back Dr. Adenauer whole-heartedly." *Plus ça change.*

ABC deserves praise for using Alger Hiss on that Nixon program. How could so central a figure be left out of a TV biography of Nixon? Protests from assorted bigots were to be expected but not former Congressman Jerry Voorhis's effort to back out of the show when he heard Hiss would be on it. . . . Our favorite comment on Nixon's defeat was by Dick Gregory, the comic now at Washington's Casino Royal. "Khrushchev lost Cuba and Nixon lost an election," Gregory said. "I never dreamed Khrushchev would be the better loser."

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